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Abstract
What would have happened if a relatively looser fisheries policy had been implemented in
the European Union (EU)? Using Bayesian methods a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilib-
rium (DSGE) model is estimated to assess the impact of the European Common Fisheries
Policy (CFP) on the economic performance of a Galician (north-west of Spain) fleet highly
dependant on the EU southern stock of hake. Our counterfactual analysis shows that if a less
effective CFP had been implemented during the period 1986-2012, ‘fishing opportunities”
would have increased, leading to an increase in labor hours of 4.87%. However, this increase
in fishing activity would have worsened the profitability of the fleet, dropping wages and
rental price of capital by 6.79% and 0.88%, respectively. Welfare would also be negatively
affected since, in addition to the increase in hours worked, consumption would have reduced
by 0.59%.
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1 Introduction
Within the European Union (EU), fisheries management programs followed a decentralized
approach: while government agencies sought to control fishing mortality, private fishing
firms decided their fishing effort and future capacity levels based on the consequent fishing
possibilities. Those fishing possibilities, determined on the basis of overall management
objectives (e.g. Maximum Sustainable Yield, -MSY-), were converted into Member State
(MS) shares using fixed share system and distributed among national fleets at a MS level.
EU fisheries historically failed to maintain healthy stocks. This was probably due to the lack
of an efficient institutional framework. However, a strong commitment on MSY objectives
set by the EU Common Fisheries Policy (CFP) always forced a strategy of recovery of fish
stocks (Cardinale et al., 2013). This recovery reduced the fishing possibilities of fleets. In
that regard, a mayor complaint from fishing firms was that the stock recovery decreased
their financial profitability.
The above is what is known as the “folk theory”: It holds that the decrease in profitability
resulted from the reduction in fishing possibilities. This theory is not devoid of arguments.
The implementation of input controls and the lack of efficient economic instruments (i.e.
quota transferability) are arguments that support this theory from the economic point of
view. Furthermore, economic theory says that more healthy stocks can increase the prof-
itability of fishing firms, but stock size recovery phases are less clear and a look at specific
case such as the Galician fleet (north-west Spain) reveals that the trend of historical prof-
itability is exactly like that described in the “folk theory”: Fewer vessels and lower financial
profitability.
It is complicated to assess this “folk theory” in a general way, because EU stock recoveries (if
any) are divided into MS and fleet shares. These shares, defined on basis of historical catch
records from the period 1973-1978 (the so-called relative stability principle), have diverged
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from the fishing capacity of the fleets in such a way that a chronic misalignment of fleet’s
fishing capacity and their fishing possibilities come to be observed, in general, in EU fisheries
(Da-Rocha and Gutie´rrez, 2006).
There are several exceptions to that partitioning of the stock recovery. When Spain and
Portugal entered wath is now the EU in 1986, the so-called southern management stocks
were defined. These management stocks, while questionable from the ecosystem point of
view, gave these two MS the possibility of managing their own stocks without committing
to a share that had to be distributed among other MS. Essentially, these two MS were able
to take advantage, alone, of the productivity of the southern stocks. Not surprisingly, these
stocks have always diverged from their management objective. This increased the number
of biomass recovery programs, echoing the “folk theory”.
This was the case of the recovery plan for the southern stock of hake (EU, 2005), which
controlled total allowable catches (TACs) in order to recover the spawning stock of biomass.
Other plans for this stock aimed to regulate (limit) the maximum number of days at sea per
vessel (EU, 2017) to reduce the fishing mortality. But the fleet reacted by adapting their
fishing effort and capacity to these plans, and the consequences were that these stocks failed
to meet their management objectives and stagnated “folk theory”.
However, given the capacity of these MS to take advantage of the productivity of the stock
without no major commitment in terms of how that productivity had to be shared, a relevant
analytical framework was set up for assessing this recovery policy and the way in which fleets
responded to it from the point of view of the productivity.
Given the decentralized fishery policy followed in the EU, single planner frameworks are
not appropriate for describing fleet responses (Da Rocha and Gutie´rrez, 2012; Da-Rocha
et al., 2017). Therefore, decentralized fishery models have to be built where forward-looking
economic agents react to fishery management programs based on optimizing individual be-
havior. This is why in this paper we have chosen a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilib-
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rium (DSGE) model. This model explains aggregate economic phenomena built on explicit
micro-foundations involving rational and forward looking optimizing behavior of individual
economic agents (Kydland and Prescott, 1982). When this model is estimated, policy shocks
can be isolated from historical disturbances that may have affected the economy.
In this paper, the estimation of the proposed model enables the effects on the fishery of the
recovery plan implemented by the CFP to be assessed. Furthermore, the model estimated
can be used to build counterfactual situations that can be compared to the real impact of
the CFP on the fleet. In that sense, a counterfactual scenario is built up to analyze what
would have happened if a relatively looser recovery policy had been applied in the southern
hake rebuilding strategy. In other words, the main aim of this paper is to show whether or
not “folk theory” can be sustained by an economic model.
2 Material and methods
2.1 Model
It is assumed that the economy is formed by four types of agents: households, firms, vessels,
and the regulatory authority, which in our context is the EU.
We consider that regulation acts as a technological constraint that can be embedded in
the model by including a lottery in household preferences (Hansen, 1985; Rogerson, 1988).
Essentially, instead of choosing the number of fishing days, households choose a probability
of fishing. This lottery framework enables the preferences of household to be written as a
function of an exogenous parameter zt that measures how regulating the maximum number
of days at sea affects household preferences. We assume that the policy implemented can be
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summarized by the following stochastic process:
zt+1 = (1 + γ)zt + εz,t+1,
where γ is an exogenous expected trend and εz,t+1 represents a white noise. Household
welfare is measured in terms of utility. The representative household derives utility from
consumption, Ct, and disutility from labor, Lt. Income from wages earned, wtLt, and rental
rates on physical capital RtKt, are used by households to purchase the consumption good and
invest, It, in productive capital. Formally, the representative household selects its lifetime
consumption and labor supply paths by solving the following intertemporal decision problem,
max
{Ct,Lt,Kt+1}∞t=0
Et
∞∑
t=0
βt {logCt − eztBLt} ,
s.t Ct + It = RtKt + wtLt,
Kt+1 = (1− eεδ,t+1δ)Kt + It,
zt+1 = (1 + γ)zt + εz,t+1,
where Et represents the expectation given the information available at period t, B is the
weight of labor in terms of consumption, β is the discount factor, δ is the capital depreciation
rate, and Rt = rt + δ is the gross capital rental rate. εδ,t+1 is an unexpected shock affecting
capital depreciation.
Note that zt is the policy variable that indirectly regulates the maximum number of days at
sea for vessels. Therefore, an unexpected positive (negative) policy shock, εz,t+1, must be
understood as a reduction in the maximum number of days at sea, which implies an increase
(reduction) in household disutility due to labor.
Firms produce the planned added value of the economy, Yt, with a Cobb-Douglas technology
that uses labor and physical capital as inputs. Formally, firms choose the input amounts
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that minimize costs such that:
min
Lt,Kt
Et {wtLt + eεr,t+1rtKt} s.t. Yt ≤ AtKαt L1−αt ,
where At is the total factor productivity (TFP) and εr,t+1 represents unexpected shocks
affecting the price of physical capital. Note that technology serves to split the added value
between income from labor and capital, with α representing the capital share of the added
value.
On the other hand, vessels select the fishing effort, Ft that enebles them to land catches,
Y Bt , compatible with the planned added value. Formally, Ft is selected taking into account
the Baranov (1918) catch function, i.e.
min
Ft
(
Y Bt − Yt
)2
s.t. Y Bt =
A∑
a=1
wa
paFt
m+ paFt
(Na,t −Na+1,t+1),
where Na,t represents the abundance fish of age a = 1...., A at time t, wa pa are the average
weight and the selectivity parameter of age a, respectively, and m is the natural mortality,
which does not depend on age.
Finally, we assume that the TFP of the economy, At, is related to the size of the fishery
stock. Formally,
At = θt
(
A∑
a=1
waNa,t
)αstock
,
where the parameter θt represents TFP shocks due to factors other than those affecting
stock abundance and αstock is the TFP elasticity. The biological model is completed with the
dynamics of the resource. We consider that the stock evolves according to an age-structured
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population model where abundance is given by
Na+1,t+1 = e
−(m+paFt)+εa,t+1Na,t,
where εa,t+1 represents an unexpected shock affecting the total mortality rate of age a.
Note that total mortality rate is decomposed into natural mortality m and fishing mortality,
paFt + εa,t+1, with pa being the selectivity parameter for age a. Moreover, recruitment (in
logarithm terms) is modeled as a 1-lag autoregressive process
logN1,t+1 = (1− ρ) logN1 + ρ logN1,t + ε1,t+1,
where ρ is the autocorrelation parameter and N1 is the mean recruitment.
This DSGE model is solved using standard numerical methods for solving forward-looking
models with rational expectations based on algorithms that linearize the system around the
steady state (Blanchard and Kahn, 1980).
2.2 Bayesian estimation
The model is applied to the Galician trawl fleet which is highly dependent on the southern
stock of hake (Sampedro et al., 2016). This fleet operates in the Iberian Atlantic waters
(limited to the north-east by the Spanish-French border and to the south-west by the Straits
of Gibraltar).
The calibration of the model consists of keeping some parameters fixed and estimating those
related to the model dynamics with Bayesian techniques. In particular, we keep fixed param-
eters for the technology of production: factor shares, α, depreciation of physical capital, δ,
and parameters from the Baranov catch equation, pa and m. We estimate those parameters
related to i) recruitment dynamics (ρ and the standard deviation of ε1,t), ii) abundance dy-
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Figure 1: Priors and posteriors. The black (grey) line represents the posterior (prior), the
vertical green line represents the posterior mode value distribution of the standard deviation
of the policy shocks associated with CFP, εz, the other (economic and biological) shocks
(εr, θ, εδ {εa}71) and of the recruitment AR process (ρ), the stock productivity (αstock), the
exogenous labor disutility (B) and its trend parameter (γ).
10 20 30
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
N1
10 20 30
0
0.5
1
1.5
N2
10 20 30
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
N3
10 20 30
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
N4
10 20 30
0
0.05
0.1
N5
10 20 30
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
N6
10 20 30
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
N7
10 20 30
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
Y
10 20 30
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
L
10 20 30
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
F
10 20 30
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
K
Figure 2: Historical and smoothed variables. The data set used includes yearly observations
(1982-2012) of abundance for seven ages, Na for a = 1, ...7, landings, Y , labor, L, fishing
mortality, F , and physical capital, K. The black (red) line represents the ‘’true” (estimated)
time series.
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Table 1: Bayesian estimation for the Southern Stock of Hake
parameters prior mean post. mean 90% HPD interval prior pstdev
ρ (recruitment persistence) 0.900 0.4585 0.2493 0.6182 invg Inf
αstock (stock productivity) 0.149 0.8526 0.7199 0.9475 invg Inf
B (labor weight) 5.595 3.1238 2.8523 3.4443 invg Inf
γ (exogenous trend) -0.010 -0.2125 -0.3732 -0.0393 norm 0.2000
standard deviation of shocks prior mean post. mean 90% HPD interval prior pstdev
εz (policy) 0.010 0.1922 0.1455 0.2419 invg Inf
εr (rental capital) 0.010 0.0060 0.0023 0.0096 invg Inf
θ (TFP) 1.000 0.2258 0.1716 0.2727 invg Inf
εδ (capital depreciation) 0.010 1.3013 0.9460 1.6794 invg Inf
ε1 (mortality age 1) 0.010 0.4001 0.3225 0.4748 invg Inf
ε2 (mortality age 2) 0.010 0.1057 0.0835 0.1264 invg Inf
ε3 (mortality age 3) 0.010 0.3684 0.2979 0.4296 invg Inf
ε4 (mortality age 4) 0.010 0.1273 0.0996 0.1550 invg Inf
ε5 (mortality age 5) 0.010 0.0857 0.0647 0.1047 invg Inf
ε6 (mortality age 6) 0.010 0.1519 0.1137 0.1907 invg Inf
ε7 (mortality age 7) 0.010 2.1096 1.4206 2.7207 invg Inf
invg: Inverse Gamma distribution; norm: Normal distribution
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Figure 3: Impulse response function: the fishery’s reaction to the impact of a 1% reduction
in εz on landings, Y , consumption, C, investment, I, physical capital, K, labor, L, wages,
W , gross capital rental rate, R, total factor productivity, A, and fishing mortality, F .
namics (standard deviations of εa,t), iii) policy dynamics (B, γ and the standard deviation
of εz,t), iv) TFP elasticity, αstock and, v) capital rental rate (standard deviations of εr,t).
The biological population data and technological (Baranov) parameters are taken from
STECF (2015). The factor share, α, is set to 1/3 following Gollin (2002) and capital depre-
tation, δ, is selected at 12.90% to match fixed capital allowances from MAPAMA. Ministerio
de Agricultura, Pesca y Alimentacio´n (2016b).
The Bayesian estimation of ρ, αstock, B and γ (carried out using Dynare software, see Collard
(2001)) involves combining the estimation of the parameters by maximum likelihood using
an observed set of data with the information obtained from prior distributions defined for
those same parameters. The data set used includes yearly observations of abundance for
seven ages, Na for a = 1, ...7, landings, Y , labor, L, fishing mortality, F , and physical
capital, K. The prior distributions used for the estimation follows the standard practice in
DSGE models. In particular, we use the parameters calibrated to match long-run averages
as priors, i.e. steady state with γ = 0.
The biological time series data (1982-2012) refers to the southern stock of hake (Merluccius
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merluccius, coded as HKE). Data is normalized using the sample median. Fishing mortality
and landings comes from ICES (2017). The capital and labor time series (2004-2012) are
built using data from the Galician Statistics Institute (IGE, Instituto Galego de Estat´ıstica)
and from the Spanish Economic Survey of Fisheries (MAPAMA. Ministerio de Agricultura,
Pesca y Alimentacio´n, 2016a).
The steady state of the model is computed assuming a capital output ratio, K/Y , of 2 and
normalizing labor in 2004 at 1/3. Finally, we assume Inverse Gamma prior distributions
for non-negative parameters (like the standard deviations of the shock processes) and prior
normal distribution for the policy coefficient, γ. Table 1 show the priors and the posterior
modes of the main parameters of interest.
Comparing the posterior estimates with the priors is informative. The posterior distributions
estimated (the black line, with the vertical green line representing the posterior modal value)
depart substantially from the prior distributions assumed (grey line). Figure 1 shows that
prior and posterior distributions of stock productivity (αstock), exogenous labor disutility
(B) and its trend parameter (γ), and the recruitment AR process (ρ) differ substantially,
indicating that the information content of the aggregated data is very informative. Figure
2 compares the evolution of the series used (the “true” time series) with that generated by
the model for the same variables.
To understand how the model works in terms of policy, we present the impulse response
functions associated with the effects of a policy shock, εz. In particular, we study the
fishery’s reaction to the impact of a 1% reduction into the maximum number of days at
sea per vessel. Figure 3 shows that , as expected, decreasing the maximum number of days
at sea per vessel (by increasing zt with a positive shock in εz) depresses value added, Yt,
consumption, Ct, investment It, total employment, Lt, and capital, Kt in the short run. On
one hand, the reduction in the hired labor makes this input more productive, leading to
an increase on wages. On the other hand, a reduction in the maximum number of days at
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sea substantially decreases fishing mortality, F , and this positively affects the abundance
of the stock, Nt, for all ages (not shown in the figure). As a result, TFP of the fishery,
At = θt
(∑7
a=1waNa,t
)αstock
, increases accordingly leading to a substantial recovery in the
future added value, consumption, investment, and profitability, Rt, of the fishery.
3 Results
The evolution of fleet performance in the period 1982-2012 observed is the result of two
factors: the economic and biological shocks hitting the economy (S = εr, θ, εδ, {εa}71) and
the policy shocks associated with the CFP, εz. The two elements are inextricably connected
and it is not possible to decompose the observable time series as the sum of the two effects
(shocks plus policy).
However, it is possible to use the proposed model estimated to measure the effects due ex-
clusively to policy shocks by simulating counterfactual situations. In particular, we compare
the observed path variables for the period 1982-2012 with the simulated path variables that
would have arisen under a different policy shocks path.
Formally, let {yt(εz,t,St)}2012t=1982 represent the path of the fishery’s observable variables as a
function of the policy shocks εz and the remaining historical exogenous shocks hitting the
fishery, S, for the period analyzed. Now define a counterfactual situation with a different path
of policy shocks for the period 1986-2005 that represents a 10% increase in the maximum
number of days with respect to the original policy, with all else being, {εˆz,t}2012t=1986. Given
that an increase in the maximum number of days is given by a negative policy shock, every
new period shock is taken as
εˆz,t = εz,t − 0.10× ‖εz,t‖.
12
1986 2005
5
10
15
20
25
(th
ou
sa
nd
) to
nn
es
 Yield, Y 
1986 2005
30
40
50
60
70
e
u
ro
s 
(m
illio
ns
) Consumption, C 
1986 2005
2
3
4
5
e
z t 
B
Labor desutility
1986 2005
100
150
200
e
u
ro
s 
(m
illio
ns
) Capital, K
1986 2005
200
300
400
(th
ou
sa
nd
) h
ou
rs Labor, L
1986 2005
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
Wage, w
1986 2005
-0.1
0
0.1
Capital rental rate, R-δ
1986 2005
0
0.5
1
Total Factor Productivity, A 
1986 2005
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
F 
Ag
es
 1
-3
Fishing mortality, F 
1986 2005
0
1
2
n
u
m
be
r (
tho
us
an
d) ×105Stock age 1, N1
1986 2005
0
5
10
15
n
u
m
be
r (
tho
us
an
d) ×104Stock age 2, N2
1986 2005
0
2
4
6
n
u
m
be
r (
tho
us
an
d) ×104Stock age 3, N3
1986 2005
year
0
5000
10000
15000
n
u
m
be
r (
tho
us
an
d) Stock age, N4
1986 2005
year
0
5000
10000
n
u
m
be
r (
tho
us
an
d) Stock age, N5
1986 2005
year
0
2000
4000
n
u
m
be
r (
tho
us
an
d) Stock age, N6
1985 2005
year
0
2000
4000
n
u
m
be
r (
tho
us
an
d) Stock age, N7
Figure 4: Counterfactual analysis: The red line represents time series associated with a less
restrictive policy in the maximum number of days, {yt(εˆz,t,St)}, and the black line represents
historical time series, {yt(εz,t,St)}.
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Note that this counterfactual analysis considers different policy shocks from 1986 on, which
correspond to the period in which the CFP applies to the Galician fleet (Spain joined the
European Community in the year 1986).
Once the counterfactual situation is defined, the model estimated is used to simulate the fish-
ery variables associated with the alternative policy shocks, {yt(εˆz,t,St)}2012t=1986. By comparing
these counterfactual paths, {yt(εˆz,t,St)}2012t=1986, with the historical ones, {yt(εz,t,St)}2005t=1986, we
can measure how the fishery’s variables are affected exclusively by a policy shock associated
with the CFP.
Before investigating the predictions of the model concerning the impact of the CFP on the
Galician fleet, it is worth highlighting that the time series obtained from the estimation
process for the policy variable, zt. Figure 4 shows two well defined regimes for the historical
path (black paths): before and after 2005, which is when the recovery plan came into effect
for the Southern Stock of hake.
Figure 4 illustrates that zt shows a decreasing trend representing a situation compatible with
an increase in the total number of days at sea for 1986-2005. During that period, historical
policy shocks increased the marginal utility of labor, eztB, leading to a 50% increase in labor
hours, Lt. This increase in the total number of days affected the stock negatively, decreasing
its abundance for all ages, Na, and the TFP, A. This lower resource productivity led to
lower wages, wt, and rental prices, rt. As a result, consumption also decreased. Therefore,
the model estimated considers that the underlying increasing trend in the total number of
days at sea between 1986 and 2005 led to a deterioration in the financial results of the fleet.
These historical paths are consistent with the lack of enforcement of the CFP evidenced by
Da Rocha et al. (2012a).
The behavior of the policy variable zt changed after 2005, when the recovery plan started.
The paths shown in Figure 4 are compatible with an increase in the total number of days at
sea (i.e with a decreasing trend of zt) from 2005 onwards. This reduced the marginal utility
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of labor, eztB, and as result total labor hours, Lt decreased dramatically. This decreasing
trend in the total number of days affected the stock positively, increasing abundance for all
ages, Na, and TFP, A. The higher resource productivity led to higher wages, wt, and rental
prices, rt. As a result, consumption increased. Therefore, the model estimated considers that
the decreasing trend in total number of days between 2005 and 2012 improved the financial
results of the fleet.
The historical and counterfactual fleet behavior are compared by computing the ratio
yt(εˆz,t,St)
yt(εz,t,St)
.
The counterfactual value is higher (lower) than the historical value when the ratio is higher
(lower) than 1. Figure 5 shows this ratio for all the variables. Our counterfactual analysis
shows that a policy equivalent to an increase of 10% in the maximum number of days at sea
would have increased labor hours (L) and fishing mortality, (Ft), for the whole period 1986-
2012 and it would have reduced wages (w), TFP (A) and consumption (C). The patterns
are not so clear when production (Y ), capital (K), and the rental price of capital, (r), are
analyzed. Table 2 shows the average counterfactual ratios of all the variables.
Table 2: Counterfactual Effects Ratio
Variable Ratio (%)
yt(εˆz,t,St)
yt(εz,t),St) × 100
Output (Y ) 99.60
Consumption (C) 99.41
Capital (K) 100.46
Labor (L) 104.87
Wages (w) 93.11
Rental Price (r) 99.11
TFP (A) 95.63
Fishing Mortality (F ) 105.03
Summarizing, the counterfactual analysis shows that relaxing the enforcement of the CFP
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during the period 1986-2012 would have worsened the economic results of the fleet by lowering
wages by 6.79% and the rental price of capital by 0.88%, on average. Economic agents would
have been affected negatively since labor would have increased by 4.87% and consumption
would have fallen by 0.59%. Also the resource would have suffered from the looser policy,
with fishing mortality increasing by 5.02% and the TFP falling by 4.37%.
4 Discussion and conclusions
Economic modeling literature addressing the management of renewable resource under un-
certainty (Reed, 1979; Clark and Kirkwood, 1986; Sethi et al., 2005) has been criticized
by biological modelers for its inadequate treatment of realistic biological dynamics and un-
certainties. As a result, in practice, government fishery management agencies manage fish
stocks based on the advice provided by using biological models based on simulation methods
(Ulrich et al., 2012; Nielsen et al., 2018).
After Tahvonen (2009) showed that age-structured fishery models representing single plan-
ners were analytically tractable, optimization methods began to be introduced into biological
models for assessing fisheries (Grafton et al., 2007; Groger et al., 2007; Dichmont et al., 2010;
Da Rocha et al., 2010; Da Rocha and Gutie´rrez, 2011; Da Rocha et al., 2012c,b, 2013, 2016;
Voss et al., 2011; Froese and Quaas, 2012).
This paper extends this optimization view of fishey models to a DSGE approach. In par-
ticular, a DSGE model is used to build a decentralized fishery where rational and forward-
looking economic agents react to fishery management programs. Using Bayesian methods,
the model is estimated to assess the impact of the CFP on the economic performance of the
Galician trawl fleet fishing the southern stock of hake. This approach complements previous
studies that also analyzed the performance of this fishery in the context of CFP regulations
(Caballero-Miguez et al., 2008; Antelo et al., 2012; Garc´ıa et al., 2016; Varela-Lafuente et al.,
16
in press, 2019).
From a policy viewpoint, the main advantage of the DSGE approach presented here is that
once the model is estimated, counterfactual situations can be simulated. This enables the
policy shocks to be isolated from historical disturbances that may have affected the economy.
This is the main reason why DSGE models, with special emphasis on Bayesian methods,
have become the main tool for policy analysis at central banks (Christiano et al., 2005;
Smets and Wouters, 2007; Andre´s et al., 2010; Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al., 2016). Our study
takes advantage of this feature to address fishery policy issues using the same methodological
approach.
Did the CFP reduce the economic performance of the Galician fleet? This is not an easy
question to answer. The pessimistic view implicit in the question is supported by studies
that analyze the CFP under perspectives ranging from restrictions on the tradeability of
quotas, (Garza-Gil and Varela-Lafuente, 2015), to stakeholder engagement (Sampedro et al.,
2016), the lack of considering unobserved genetic diversity (Villasante, 2012) and the use
of moratoriums as a management tool (Garza-Gil et al., 2011). In this diverse context, our
study focuses on the impact of the CFP on the productivity of the fleet in order to answer
the question. We find that, when endogenous productivity is taken into account, if a looser
CFP had been implemented in 1986-2012 the income obtained by the owners of the vessels
and crews would not have increased, i.e. we show that the “folk theory” is not necessarily
borne out in this illustration.
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